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"Safety First" is a popular theme, inside and outside 
of the workplace. Yet every day, accidents happen. In the 
business world, an accident automatically results in lost 
productivity. Production and/or service is delayed while 
the area is secured, reports made, and medical treatment 
applied, if necessary. In the last two decades safety has 
carried a high level of importance. The passage of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 is one reason. 
In addition, as American companies face increased 
competition in the global arena, they are looking for ways 
to increase quality and decrease costs. In today's 
competitive environment, every second counts. 
Workers' accidents are extremely costly in more than 
one way. In terms of moral responsibility, society now 
expects employers to provide a safe working environment. 
Morally, the costs of accidents must be expressed in terms 
other than monetary. The employees involved and/or injured 
may suffer emotional damage, and society also pays the price 
in terms of death or serious disabilities of individuals 
(Finkin, Goldman, & Summers, 1989). 
Employers' legal responsibilities have been accentuated 
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by the passage of OSHA. In the case of an employee's death 
caused by willful violations of the employer, not only are 
substantial monetary fines imposed, but individuals of the 
company may face criminal prosecution, and imprisonment 
(Finkin et al., 1989). In addition, companies have a 
financial responsibility for safety. Costs of accidents can 
be broken down into two categories. The first category is 
insurable costs, which cover medical treatment and temporary 
and permanent disability payments to the employee(s). 
Uninsurable costs are those involving administration, such 
as accident investigation and reporting. Also involved are 
the costs of lost productivity because of work stoppage at 
the time of the accident, repair or replacement of damaged 
equipment, loss of the injured employee(s)' production, and 
overtime or replacement costs necessary to fill in for the 
injured employee. There is the added cost of providing the 
injured employee benefits while out on disability (Meola, 
1990). In addition, companies face an incredible liability 
in terms of possible OSHA fines. The financial costs can add 
up quickly, no matter how minor the accident/injury. The 
company's responsibility to its shareholders is to make 
profit. Yet, accident costs can greatly affect the success 
or failure in this goal. 
As companies look for ways to prevent accidents from 
occurring, many causes may surface. The use of unsafe 
equipment, lack of knowledge, and the push for speed in 
production are some of these reasons. 
Many employers feel that employees themselves do not 
care about safety, or at least are not aware of its 
importance. To change this prevailing attitude, employers 
look for ways to increase safety awareness. One popular 
means of reducing accidents is the use of safety incentive 
programs. By offering employee awards for an accident free 
time period, employers are attempting to lower the accident 
rate. Another approach to reduce accidents is through 
behavior management, where an employee's job is broken down 
into steps, and safe behavior applied to each step of the 
process. The use of incentives are often used in this type 
of program, rewarding employees for their safe behavior. 
Studies have shown, however, that training and knowledge, 
combined with feedback, will induce employees to practice 
safe behavior (Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson, 1980). 
Problem Statement 
This thesis researches occupational safety programs, 
and attempts to define the factors necessary for success in 
developing a safe workplace. The following chapters will 
discuss the evolution of safety management, review studies 
of the various types of safety programs, and discuss the 
similarity of safety and total quality management. In 
addition, a research study of the effectiveness of one 
company's safety program will be discussed. All of these 




How can a safety program be more effective? 
CHAPTER 2 
THE EVOLUTION OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
The beginning of safety programs evolved as workers 
began the fight for unionization and workers compensation 
laws. At this time, if an employee was injured, there was 
no economic support available for the employee who was not 
able to continue working. Common law favored the employer 
in the form of the "'Unholy Trinity'" (Finkin, et al., 1989, 
p. 364). This term represented the three defenses used by 
employers to win lawsuits. Assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, and/or the fellow servant rule prevented 
employees from collecting money from the employer for 
injuries incurred on the job. 
However, the issue of safety was becoming a public 
concern, and in 1867 Massachusetts began factory inspections 
(Colling, 1990, p.3). In 1869 the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics was formed to begin study on the kind and causes 
of accidents in factories. The first safety legislation was 
passed in 1877, requiring use of guards for hazardous 
machinery. In 1892, the first recorded safety program was 
developed at the Illinois Steel Company, in response to an 
explosion of a flywheel. A committee of executives was 
formed to evaluate the accident, and as a result, all 
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flywheels were then inspected and tested. 
Finally, in 1908, the first worker's compensation law 
was passed, covering federal employees. In 1911, New Jersey 
became one of the first states to pass workers' compensation 
laws. As a result, one writer concludes: "Workmen's 
compensation laws have done more to promote safety than all 
other measures collectively, because employers found it more 
cost effective to concentrate on safety than to compensate 
employees for injury or loss of life" (Colling, 1990, p. 4). 
The approach toward safety during this period had been 
greatly affected by Frederick W. Taylor's work, The 
Principles of Scientific Management in 1911. Taylor's 
efficiency studies highlighted the effects of lost time, 
lost personnel, and lost materials due to accidents on 
efficiency. This "led to an early understanding of the 
important interrelationship between safety and management 
that we recognize today" (Colling, 1990, p.l). The 
responsibilities of management in the early part of the 
century were defined differently than they are today. In a 
1921 study, The Health of the Industrial Worker, the 
researchers discuss the prevalence of eye injuries in the 
stone-cutting industry. They write: 
These injuries (called by the men "fires" in the eye) 
are practically entirely preventable by the wearing of 
suitable goggles; the glass of goggles, however, in a 
few weeks becomes frosted from the frequent impact of 
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particles and requires renewal. The men prefer to run 
the risk rather than take this small trouble, and men 
are to be seen at work, who have already lost the sight 
of one eye, still declining to wear goggles (Collis & 
Greenwood, 1921, p. 187). 
In situations like these, injuries were viewed as the result 
of worker carelessness. As long as safety equipment was 
provided, even if not utilized, management accepted no 
further responsibility to the worker. 
In 1931, Herbert w. Heinrich made a major impact on the 
field of safety with the publication of Industrial Accident 
Prevention. While working for the Travelers Insurance 
Company, Heinrich analyzed 75,000 industrial accidents. He 
concluded that 88% of accidents were due to unsafe acts of 
workers, 10% to unsafe conditions, and 2% of accidents were 
unavoidable. Heinrich created the first theory of accident 
causation, built upon a list of ten statements he termed the 
"Axioms of Industrial Safety" (Heinrich, 1931, pp. 13-14). 
Heinrich's theory became known as the "Domino Theory" 
(Heinrich, 1931, pp. 14-15), in that he named five 
sequential accident factors (ancestry and social 
environment, fault of person, unsafe act and/or 
mechanical/physical hazard, accident, and injury) which 
affect each other just as dominoes placed on end do. The 
removal of the third factor, that of the unsafe act/hazard, 
can prevent the other factors from resulting in an injury. 
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This theory greatly influenced how management approached 
safety control for years. "Most safety programs which are 
built upon the principles of control have their roots in the 
original Domino Theory and its management-oriented updated 
forms" (Collings, 1990, p.30). 
In a 1939 work titled Industrial Hygiene, the authors 
provide management with a checklist for promoting the health 
of workers. Under the topic of work place they discuss 
factors such as noise level, work positions, and body 
mechanics. They advise that provision of a safe environment 
can be accomplished through safety engineering and safety 
education. Other topics covered are employment and 
placement, the organization of work, supervision, health 
instruction for the worker, and extra factory activities. 
In a prelude to management theory of today, the authors 
advise "the want for a feeling of personal worth is one of 
the most fundamental desires of man. This feeling of 
personal worth comes largely from satisfactory relationships 
with one's superior and with one's associates" (Lanza & 
Goldberg, 1939, p. 587). 
Greatly influenced by Heinrich's work, other 
researchers have continued building theories on safety. The 
Ferrell Human Factor Model is based on the premise that 
accidents are the result of a chain of incidents beginning 
with human error. Ferrell defines three situations of human 
error: 1) overload, which occurs when the work load and the 
capacity of the person is mismatched, 2) an incorrect 
response by the person to the situation, and 3) an improper 
activity (Collings, 1991, p. 31). 
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A contemporary safety researcher, Dan Peterson, further 
developed the Ferrell system, to include system failure. 
Peterson's Accident/Incident Causation Model has more 
clearly defined categories of human error: 1) overload, 
2) ergonomic traps, and 3) decision to err (Heinrich, 
Petersen, & Roos, 1980). Peterson expands on the category 
of decision to err. He acknowledges that the employee is 
often able to choose to perform the task unsafely, and that 
this choice may be made either consciously or unconsciously. 
Major reasons in this decision are peer influences, time 
pressures, and priorities set by social, political, and/or 
economic forces. Peterson's model has moved the field of 
safety to the point of acknowledging that an unsafe act is 
not just the result of a poor decision by an employee, but 
rather, may be pre-determined by extenuating factors. This 
then poses new challenges to safety professionals. 
Management theory needs to be incorporated into the field of 
safety in order to create an environment which values and 
promotes safety. 
In review of management theories of today, Collings 
connects Herzberg's (1968) two-factor theory to safety. In 
Herzberg's theory, motivators are those factors that provide 
sources of satisfaction, while hygiene factors are those 
that are the source of dissatisfaction. Safety falls under 
the area of hygiene factors. As a result, meeting all 
safety needs can only reduce job dissatisfaction. 
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Therefore, "to create job satisfaction, we must turn to the 
motivators. In other words, we have to set up a competent 
safety program to eliminate dissatisfaction, and then 
determine what else our people need to provide satisfaction" 
(Collings, 1990, pp. 40-41). 
The use of management theory incorporated into the 
field of safety has increased the success of safety 
programs. However, new challenges from the technological 
growth have continued to affect employees' safety. The 
actual work environment of most businesses has experienced 
major change. New products, chemicals, and machinery 
continued to increase the threat to worker's health and 
safety. Although by 1960 most states had some type of 
safety and occupational health laws, there was often little 
enforcement (Finkin, et al., 1989, p. 365). In 
congressional testimony, the Secretary of Labor testified 
"that in 1968 an estimated 14,500 workers were killed and 
2.2 million were disabled each year in industrial accidents, 
resulting in a loss of 250 million man days of work and $8 
billion loss in Gross National Product" (Finkin, et al., 
1989, p. 366). Congress decided that national legislation 
was necessary to force all companies to create safer working 
environments. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 was passed as a result. OSHA places two duties on 
employers. The first is that of the "general duty clause: 
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Each employer--l)shall furnish to each of his employees 
employment and a place of employment which are free from 
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serous physical harm to his employees ... " (Finkin 
et al., 1989, p. 367). In addition, the second duty is that 
every employer must comply with OSHA standards. The passage 
of OSHA has made it even more important that employers 
utilize all of their resources to create and promote a safe 
environment. 
In summary, the area of safety has grown from one of 
individual responsibility to the legal, moral, and economic 
responsibility of corporations. New technology, as well as 
an increasingly diverse workforce has forced companies to 
look for different and innovative ways to achieve safety. 
While provision of a safe environment is an important base 
factor for safety, individual behavior remains as the area 
in which companies search for the best method to inspire 
safety. The next chapter will review the literature on the 




Because it is usually impossible to eliminate all 
environmental deterrents to safety, it is necessary to 
influence employees to avoid unsafe acts. In a review of 
safety literature, Peters (1991) identifies five strategies 
to improve safety performance: incentives, disciplinary 
actions, fear messages, behavior modeling, and employee 
surveys. In selecting one of these strategies, he advises 
that the cost and effectiveness of the method be reviewed, 
as well as the nature of work, the social and physical 
components of the work environment, the attitudes of both 
management and labor, and the available resources. 
In the area of incentives for safe behavior, after 
reviewing the literature, Peters identifies the need for 
further research to determine which incentives are more 
successful, and under what conditions they are helpful. In 
addition, the longevity of the effects of the incentive 
needs to be studied. While reviewing the use of 
disciplinary actions, Peters reveals that there is little 
evidence of those organizations who utilize discipline in 
safety, and whether or not it is effective. He concludes 
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that positive reinforcement is more widely advocated than 
the negative actions of discipline. 
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In regards to the use of fear messages, the longevity 
of attitude and behavior changes due to fear messages are 
two areas also needing further research. In addition, the 
discrepancy between attitude changes and behavior changes 
continues to be unexplained. Behavior modeling, defined as 
(a) viewing the approved behavior, (b) practicing the 
behavior, and (c) transferring the behavior learning to the 
actual environment, has not yet been determined to be an 
effective technique for motivating employees to increase 
their self-protective behavior. 
In discussing the fifth area, Peters recommends using 
employee survey results to facilitate group discussions. 
These discussions can result in higher levels of interest, 
in-depth thinking, and commitment to safety rules. The 
increase in employee involvement also results in elevated 
awareness, a strengthening of employee beliefs of the 
seriousness of hazards, as well as an individual's sense of 
control over their personal safety. 
In summary, Peters' review demonstrates the varied 
approaches to safety while highlighting the need for further 
research in all areas. Behavior-modeling and the use of 
incentives are the most widely studied systems, and this 
paper will review some of the more recent works. In 
addition, studies on employee attitudes, fear messages, and 
14 
quality of work life and their affect on safety will be 
reviewed. 
Positive Reinforcement and Feedback 
In a paper by McAfee and Winn (1989), 24 studies on the 
use of positive reinforcement and feedback on safety are 
reviewed. All of the studies evaluated utilized statistical 
data, a before and after design, and provided enough details 
to compare with the other studies. The independent 
variables of the overall review are "(a) monetary 
incentives, (b) praise and feedback, and (c) team 
competitions which may also have involved the use of cash 
awards" (McAfee & Winn, 1989, p. 9). The dependent 
variables were the causal variables, such as using 
protective equipment, and the end-result variables, or the 
actual injuries. All of the studies looked at short-term 
outcome variables rather than long-term ramifications, such 
as employee satisfaction. 
The review of studies found that each concluded that 
the use of incentive/feedback improved safety and or reduced 
the number of accidents. However, limitations were found, 
and the causal relationship between the reward/feedback and 
the outcome were not explained in the studies. McAfee and 
Winn developed a model that "suggests that the relationship 
between incentives/feedback and these end-result variables 
may be moderated by three situational variables 
(environmental, individual, and task characteristics)" 
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(McAfee & Winn, 1989, p. 16). While concluding with several 
topics of proposed future studies, these researchers reflect 
that the reviewed works serve as alternatives to traditional 
safety programs, as well as provide examples of how to 
design safety programs to fit specific work conditions. 
Karan and Kopelman (1986) researched the effects of 
feedback on the safety related outcomes of vehicular 
accidents and industrial accidents. The use of feedback can 
act as a reinforcer as well as a punisher. Three vehicle 
maintenance and dispatch facilities of a nation-wide package 
forwarding organization were studied. During a 43-week 
period, Facility A was provided feedback in regards to the 
number of accidents during the current fiscal year to date, 
the number of accidents during the same period the previous 
year, the number of days since the last accident, and a 
ranking in terms of improvement. The results were given for 
each shift of employees in the facility. Facilities Band C 
were utilized as comparison groups. The researchers 
concluded that the institution of objective outcome feedback 
resulted in a 22.32% improvement in vehicular safety 
performance and a 15.88% improvement in the industrial 
safety performance. The use of feedback was successful in 
that accidents occurred less frequently in the experimental 
facility. In addition, the implementation of the program 
was inexpensive, while the dollar savings gained from the 
overall improvement in vehicular safety were about $28,129. 
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The researchers conclude their study with the challenge for 
future research in the comparison of the relative efficacy 
of outcome feedback versus behavioral feedback in the area 
of safety performance. 
Haynes, Pine, and Fitch (1982) also studied the use of 
outcome feedback. However, in addition, they utilized team 
competition and incentives. Their study evaluated the 
effectiveness of a researcher-created intervention package 
intended to reduce the accident rate of an urban mass 
transit operation. This operation was experiencing rising 
accident costs. The authors developed an intervention 
package with three parts: 1) performance feedback, in terms 
of number of accidents, 2) team competition, where teams 
accrued points based on accident rates, and 3) incentives. 
The program was conducted during an 18 week period using the 
incentives. Data was also collected for an 18 week period 
after the completion of the incentive program. The 
experimental group reduced their accident rate 24.9% per 100 
operators during the incentive period. In the following 
period, the numbers were non-significant. Because this 
study was conducted during an unusually severe winter, the 
use of a control group allowed the results to be evaluated 
independent of the changes in weather. This study was 
unable to measure unsafe driving behavior, due to the 
logistics of vehicles, drivers, and their routes. The 
authors concluded that the combination of performance 
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feedback, team competition, and inexpensive incentives 
support a reduction in the experimental group's accident 
rate. In terms of cost, they concluded that the 
relationship between monies spent on incentives, versus 
monies spent on average accident claim settlement costs, was 
cost effective. They write: "The use of low cost 
contingent monetary incentives in conjunction with other 
reinforcers such as feedback and competition can be 
justified based on cost effectiveness alone" (Haynes et al., 
1982, p. 415). 
While all of the programs claimed to be successful, 
there still remains a question as to the causal relationship 
between the lowered accident rates and the feedback and 
incentives. In the Haynes et. al study, there is the 
additional question as to whether the feedback, team 
competition, and incentives all played an equal part in the 
result. The next section reviews the use of incentives on 
their own to inspire the desired results, and reviews a 
study in which safety posters alone are used to increase 
hazard awareness. 
Incentives and Safety Posters 
Another study of the use of incentives to improve 
safety performance was completed by Fox, Hopkins, and Anger 
{1987). The study was conducted at two open pit mines, and 
ran for 12 years at one site, and over 11 years at the 
other. Tokens were awarded to all employees each month for 
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1) not suffering a lost time injury or injury with 
physician's care, 2) if all the workers under one supervisor 
did not suffer lost time or physician-treated injury, 3) for 
safety suggestions, preventative acts, and miscellaneous 
actions recognized by the safety committee. In addition, 
stamps were withheld based on the length of time missed from 
work, and none of the group members could receive any tokens 
until the injured employee returned to work. The failure to 
report accidents and damage to equipment also resulted in 
the loss of tokens. The tokens were in the form of trading 
stamps that could be exchanged at stores or a catalog for a 
wide range of merchandise, such as household appliances. 
The researchers write: "All of the results are strong 
evidence that behavioral programs can be faithfully 
administered and that the effects of those programs can be 
maintained for extensive periods of time" (Fox et al., 1987, 
p. 222). They report a substantial decrease in the number 
of days lost to accidents during the first year of the 
program. By the end of the second year, the number of lost-
time injuries ran about 15% of the average baseline rates at 
one location, and at 32% of the average baseline rate at the 
other location. In terms of the costs of accidents and 
injuries, both locations saw decreases of approximately 90%: 
from $294,000 to $29,000 at location one, and from $367,696 
to $38,972 at the other. The cost ratios of dollars saved 
to dollars spent on the program ranged from 18.1 to 27.8, 
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and 12.9 to 20.7 at the two locations, adjusted for 
inflation and hours worked. In addition, the mine managers 
suggested that the token program also increased the morale 
of the staff at both locations. 
While contests may promote an increase in the desired 
behavior, there are also possible negative side effects that 
can result. Hampton (1970) focuses on the negative affects 
that any type of contest can cause within an organization. 
Hampton researched eight contests of eight companies in 
diverse industries. He found that all the contests were 
successful in meeting their purpose, but additionally, that 
all had side effects. The majority of the behavioral side 
effects fall into three classes. Neglect occurs when a 
contest is so successful that efforts are drawn away from 
routine concerns. The second side effect is conflict, which 
can occur between superiors and subordinates, those in 
lateral or work-flow relations, or between salesman and 
customers. The last side effect is that of dishonesty, or 
abuse of the standards. The study also reveled three 
sources for the side effects: defective design, defective 
implementation, and employee values. "The systemic effects 
of contests on organizational behavior are, therefore, more 
diverse than the contest objectives, but contest 
administrators look for and measure results only in terms of 
contest objectives" (Hampton, 1970, p. 86). To avoid this 
situation, before implementation of a contest, a company 
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needs to ask "Is what the contest does for the company worth 
what it does to it?" (Hampton, 1970, p. 86). 
Another popular process to promote safety is the use of 
safety posters. These may be used with or without an 
incentive program. In an European study, the use of safety 
posters was studied to determine whether hazard 
consciousness among workers could be significantly enhanced 
(Saarela, 1989). The campaign materials were developed 
after a safety analysis was completed on the number of 
scaffold accidents within a shipyard in Finland. The poster 
campaign began with a training seminar for 10% of the 
personnel. Posters and handouts were then circulated and 
posted throughout the department. The design of the study 
included pre- and post- campaign interviews and observation 
sessions. In addition, a before and after accident analysis 
was completed. 
The results demonstrated that workers were more 
conscious of the hazards associated with scaffolds after the 
campaign's conclusion. All the employee recognized the 
poster, while every fifth worker had heard his/her 
supervisor discuss the kick-off training session material. 
Observations, however, did produce continued unsafe 
behaviors. While the numbers of accidents did decrease, the 
decrease actually followed a trend that had begun prior to 
the study. Overall, the researcher concluded that the 
campaign was effective in enhancing hazard consciousness and 
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that a written message was more effective than an oral 
message. The fact that some improvement was noticed in work 
practices, yet that the campaign's effect was modest is 
supported by other studies that demonstrate that 
informational safety campaigns are seldom strong enough to 
provide outstanding improvements. "Awareness of hazards 
cannot alone ensue safety" (Saarela, 1989, p. 184). 
While safety posters themselves may not be sufficient 
to change all behaviors to be more safe, perhaps when 
combined with an incentive program success will follow. The 
Fox et. al study is especially significant in the field of 
safety in that it was conducted for such a long period of 
time with such success. However, the Hampton (1970) review 
demonstrates that careful preparation and implementation is 
necessary to ensure that an incentive program provides 
strong enough results to override any negative side effects. 
The use of incentives and safety posters provide companies 
with some options when designing a safety program. With any 
program, however, a careful review of the organization's 
culture is necessary to best tailor the program for success. 
Employee's attitudes and their perception of hazards are 
important issues to address when designing a safety program. 
The next section reviews studies conducted on these two 
topics. 
Employee Attitudes and Fear Messages 
In a study of an European company, Cox and Cox (1991) 
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found that "safety cultures reflect attitudes, beliefs, 
perceptions and values that employees share in relation to 
safety" (1991, p. 93). The company studied was very safety 
conscious and applied four principles: 1) that all 
accidents are preventable, 2) safety is a line management 
responsibility, 3) safety is a condition of employment, and 
4) management is responsible for safety of its employees. 
The study itself was set up as a program to further develop 
the safety culture. A questionnaire was developed, and 
distributed. Of 821 respondents, there were 630 complete 
cases for factor analysis. The resulting data described 
five factors which support employee attitudes to safety: 
1) effectiveness of arrangements for safety, 2) individual 
responsibility, 3) personal skepticism, 4) safeness of work 
environment, and 5) personal immunity. In conclusion, the 
researchers advise that expression of individual 
responsibility is rewarded, and that companies should build 
on employees knowledge and positive evaluation of 
arrangements for safety and safeness of the work 
environment. In addition, it is necessary to change 
unconstructive beliefs about personal immunity, and to 
reduce skepticism over safety. 
Goldberg, Dar-El, and Rubin (1989) tested their ideas 
about the role that workers' perception of threat plays in 
choice of behaviors. Beginning their study, they looked to 
see what promotes a worker to become fatalistic, and what 
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would promote an employee's willingness to become 
participative in promoting safety. The results of the study 
found that workers often overstate the potential dangerous 
conditions they work in. The study confirmed that this 
perceived threat did move the employee in one of the two 
ways, but was inconclusive as to how to move them toward 
participation, rather than a fatalistic attitude. They 
conclude: "the primary task for management in dealing with 
many organizational maladies may be to find ways to channel 
worker reactions away from withdrawal, and instead aim for 
collective security within participative activities" 
(Goldberg et al., 1989, p. 120). 
Both of these studies enhance the field of safety, as 
well as demonstrate that safety is a complex issue. The Cox 
& Cox study provides employers with the variables that 
affect employees' attitudes toward safety, yet does so 
within an environment which had a history of promoting 
safety. Further study would be needed to compare these 
perceptions to those of employees from organizations that 
did not have such a history. In addition, study is needed 
to further define what motivates an employee to become more 
safety-confident rather than fatalistic. While the 
literature in these areas is limited, there is an array of 
literature on the topic of organizational behavior 
management. The next section will discuss the many recent 
studies available in this area. 
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Organizational Behavior Management 
Even when a employee recognizes a safety hazard, he/she 
still has a choice of behaviors or actions within that area 
of safety. Geller (1989) argues that motivating people in 
the area of prevention is difficult, because in many cases, 
such as smoking, the unsafe act is followed by immediate 
pleasure, with the potential negative factor, such as 
cancer, being a distant possibility. Geller focuses solely 
on the application of organizational behavior management 
(OBM) on occupational safety in his 1989 study. In terms of 
preventing occupational accidents, one should look at the 
specific completed behaviors of those involved, and the 
behaviors that did not occur, since they could have 
prevented the accident. Findings from this study suggest 
that behavior modification can be applied to promote the use 
of safe behaviors, and to discourage the use of the unsafe 
behaviors. Geller has designed a program of OBM within the 
acronym of DO RITE: 
1. Define the target behavior. 
2. Observe the target behavior. 
3. Record the observations. 
4. Intervene to increase the occurrence of desired 
behavior. 
5. Test the impact of behavior change strategies .... 
6. Evaluate whether to continue, refine, or 
discontinue the intervention program by examining 
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graphic displays of the target behavior(s) during 
baseline, intervention, and withdrawal phases. (Geller, 
1989, pp. 183-185). 
Geller (1989) makes an important comment, that "safety must 
not be considered a priority in an organization, because 
priorities can be shifted according to the demand of other 
priorities" (Geller, 1989, p. 185). Rather, according to 
Geller, safety needs to be built into the system. 
Similarly, in a study by Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson 
(1980), another example of an immediate reward following an 
unsafe practice was found. Workers who performed an unsafe 
act were sometimes rewarded by completing their tasks more 
quickly. For this study, the authors defined safe behaviors 
for four sections of a city's vehicle maintenance 
department. Observations of behaviors were listed under the 
classifications of 1) proper use of equipment and tools, 
2) use of safety equipment, 3) housekeeping and, 4) general 
safety procedures. These observations were made over a 
period of 45 weeks, broken into periods of 1) baseline data, 
2) training only, 3) training and feedback, 4) training only 
a second time, and a final period of 5) training and 
feedback. While a slight increase of safe behavior was 
found in each period of training, an even greater increase 
was found during the training and feedback period. Thus, 
when the workers knew the level of their performance of safe 
behaviors, they continued and increased that behavior. The 
26 
authors also found that the workers responded favorably to 
the safety program, even starting an informal competition to 
increase safe behaviors. 
The pinpointing of which safe behaviors to measure can 
play an important part in conducting a successful program. 
Sulzer-Azaroff and Fellner (1984) propose that "establishing 
criteria for using a more objective, valid, data-based 
system for identifying targets of change probably would be 
more cost effective and efficient over the long-term" 
(Sulzer-Azaroff & Fellner, 1984, p. 55). To do so, the 
authors reviewed records, conducted interviews, observed 
safety inspections, set priorities for items to be observed, 
refined and clarified items, and developed a recording 
system. The authors compare this system to the use of 
quality circles, in that input from workers, participative 
decision-making, and small-group work can make this process 
stronger. 
Expanding upon the last study, Sulzer-Azaroff, Loafman, 
Merante, Hlavacek (1990) took a previously developed injury 
prevention model to test in a large industrial plant. The 
process they followed was to determine safe behaviors, make 
observations, and then apply feedback, reinforcement, and 
goal setting. Target behaviors, called pinpoints, were set 
for all levels of personnel involved in the program. The 
results showed a reduction in lost time accidents to almost 
zero, and a large drop in OSHA recordable accidents. The 
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safety scores ranged from 90% to 100% for the three 
departments that had previously had the highest injury rates 
in the plant. The authors observed: "workers comments were 
reported to be overwhelmingly positive. They often inquired 
about their safety performance prior to formal posting and 
asked what they could do to improve it" (Sulzer-Azaroff et 
al., 1990, p. 118). In addition, the company's safety 
director commented that the design of this program fit the 
company's need for a positive behavioral approach, in 
contrast to a program focused on the negative goal of 
accidents. 
In another study on organizational behavior management, 
Reber, Wallin, and Chhokar (1984) designed a three part 
study based on Heinrich's (1959) theory that 88% of all 
accidents are caused by unsafe acts. To see if this three-
tiered approach could reduce accidents, they used an 
observational checklist, goal setting and feedback, and a 
multiple baseline design. The results' negative correlation 
"indicates that the higher the behavioral safety 
performance, the lower the accident rate, thus furnishing an 
indirect proof of the validity of the safety measurement 
procedure" (p. 123). The authors conclude that employees, 
when provided with specific, achievable goals and feedback, 
would follow behavioral safety rules. The study also 
demonstrated the cost savings involved in using a behavioral 
safety program. The cost of the program was $25,000, yet 
savings due to reduction of lost time accidents, and the 
lowering of the company's accident insurance premiums were 
estimated at approximately $120,000. 
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In another study, Reber and Wallin (1983) demonstrate 
the direct relationship between behavioral measures of 
safety and injury rates. Since occupational accidents are 
considered "rare" events, due to their infrequent occurrence 
in relationship to the frequent occurrence of unsafe 
behavior, the researchers looked at data over a period of 
time. They used baseline data to reflect past performance, 
and found that departments with a higher level of 
performance per the rules tended to have a lower incidence 
rate, and vice versa. 
Reber and Wallin stress the importance of knowledge of 
results in their study published in 1984. In this study, 
they looked at the effects of knowledge of results (KR) and 
goal setting on improving safety. Using the same study of a 
farm machinery manufacturer (Reber, Wallin, Chhokar, 1984) 
they designed four phases: 1) baseline, 2) training only, 
3) training and goal setting, and 4) training, goal setting 
and knowledge of results. The same safety goals were set 
for each department, with all department supervisors in 
agreement that they were difficult, but achievable. During 
the last phase, knowledge of results was provided to 
employees up to two to four times a week. The authors 
conclude that knowledge of results was a key factor in 
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increasing employees' safe behavior: "although behavioral 
safety performance did improve significantly after a goal 
was assigned and apparently accepted, in general the goal 
was not achieved until KR was provided" (Reber & Wallin, 
1984, p. 556). The authors proceed to hypothesize that 
knowledge of results adds an extra incentive to increase the 
use of safe behavior. In conclusion, this study showed that 
a behavioral safety program will be enhanced by the addition 
of difficult, but achievable goals, and providing feedback, 
so that employees know where they are in meeting those 
goals. 
To demonstrate further the importance of goals and 
feedback to a behavioral safety program, Reber, Wallin, and 
Chhokar (1990) conducted a study at a farm machinery 
manufacturing plant using the three departments with the 
most safety problems. This project was designed to 
replicate the 1984 study in another field setting. The data 
was collected via an observational checklist for 55 weeks, 
resulting in a total of 167 observations. The dependent 
variables were the percentage of employees in each 
department performing the job in a safe manner, and the 
frequency of on the job injuries as defined by OSHA. Once 
again, the study incorporated a multiple baseline design 
across departments, with the four periods of 1) baseline, 
2) training only, 3) training and goal setting, and 
4) training, goal setting, and knowledge of results (KR). 
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The major finding of the study was that KR is a 
beneficial for achievement of maximum performance when 
specific, difficult, and achievable goals are set. The 
researchers found that behavioral safety performance did 
improve significantly after the goal was assigned and 
accepted, but that the goal was not consistently achieved 
until KR was added. KR and goal setting are more effective 
in performance improvement than goal setting alone. 
Lower accident rates, cost savings, and increased 
employee acceptance and participation are the positive 
results incurred from adoption of an organizational behavior 
management approach to safety. This approach is also 
attractive in that it can be applied to different industries 
and geographic regions as the studies demonstrate. By 
establishing the direct relation of unsafe behavior to 
accident rates, these studies also provide the causal link 
that many safety studies lack. An underlying theme of these 
programs lies in the importance of the employee acceptance 
and participation of the programs. Knowledge of results in 
the Reber et. al study, and employee's acceptance and 
participation cited in the Sulzer-Azaroff et al. study 
support the recent management theory of employee 
participation and empowerment. The next section reviews a 
study on how the quality of work life affects safety. 
Quality of Worklife 
In their study, Harshbarger and Rose (1991) began with 
the hypothesis that success in improving industrial safety 
and reducing worker's compensation costs could be attained 
by accomplishing two goals: 1) a reduction in accidents, 
and 2) improvement in the quality of worklife. Based upon 
this, they developed a program for two corporations. 
At company A, they visited plants and discussed the 
safety performance with management. They found that the 
plants with the lower safety records were distinguished by 
1) hazards took longer to remove or repair, 2) managers 
describe workers as poor quality and not caring, and 
3) workers described managers in the same terms. The 
researchers then selected the plant with the worst safety 
record for their pilot program. The first step was to 
"shift the paradigm" (Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 136). 
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The managers and supervisors were taught to move from the 
tradition of finding fault with employees and focusing on 
accidents to instead, focusing their attention on competence 
and safe performance. Incentives were established for safe 
performance, and feedback loops in the form of posters 
displaying current safety performance were also utilized. 
In addition, the plant began holding periodic meetings on 
safety, and safe performance became part of the management 
meetings as well as part of their evaluations. The second 
step of the program was to "Build the community" 
(Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 136). A safety committee was 
empowered and listened to, while social networks were 
32 
developed via work groups. Employees who had repeated lost 
time injuries were counseled, re-trained, and shifted to 
less risky assignments. The result of this program was that 
within 60 days the number of lost time accidents dropped to 
zero and stayed at zero for nine months. 
The researchers used the same evaluation procedures at 
company B, and found the same results. At this location 
they developed a four component program. The first two 
parts were the same as at Company A: 1) Shift the paradigm 
and 2) Build the community. Step 3 was "Manage the crisis 
of an accident" (Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 139). This 
meant that management changed their view of an accident as a 
disruption in work performance and began to see it as a 
crisis in the life of the employee and his/her work group. 
This lead to rapid response, and the attempt to reduce the 
accident severity via the use of support systems. Quick 
treatment, a prompt return-to-work, and outside 
rehabilitation services were essential to meet these goals. 
The final step was "Reinforce and maintain performance" 
(Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 140). Organizationally, 
visible feedback loops such as posted results and active 
reports were utilized in this step. This program reduced 
the lost time accidents by 87%, from 67 to only nine. The 
researchers feel that "the management practices portion of 
the problem may be far larger than previously imagined" 
(Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 142). They see safety and 
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worker's compensation as a problem of choice. Workers who 
have accidents can unnecessarily choose the role of injured 
or disabled employee, management can choose to ignore human 
needs, and senior management can choose to make safety a 
priority or to ignore it. 
This appears to be the only study in this area of 
quality of work life and safety, but perhaps it is just the 
beginning. Empowerment, quality circles, and total quality 
management (TQM) are still relatively new theories, and 
their applications to safety are beginning to come to light. 
Chapter 6 addresses the area of TQM and safety, as well as 
discusses companies that have successfully combined the two. 
This literature review has reviewed the diverse approaches 
to safety that exist. Incentives, posters, knowledge of 
employees' attitudes and perceptions, and organizational 
behavior management are all tools that can be used to create 
a safe environment. The various program successes 
demonstrate that different approaches can be successful in 
different environments. The next section reviews a study of 
successful safety program characteristics. This information 
can be valuable in helping a company choose the right 
approach to safety. However, without the right support and 
commitment, no program will be able to succeed. 
Characteristics of Successful Safety Programs 
In a further search to define the characteristics of 
successful safety programs, Smith, Cohen, Cohen, and 
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Cleveland (1978) conducted a companion study to a 1975 mail-
out questionnaire survey in which matched pairs of high and 
low accident rate plants were compared. In the second 
study, a team of safety professionals visited seven pairs of 
plants with two purposes. "1) To evaluate and validate the 
results of the earlier questionnaire study, and 2) to add to 
the knowledge gained from that study by looking at safety 
program features in more detail and by examining features 
that could not be examined in a questionnaire" (Smith et 
al., 1978, p. 5). 
Information was collected via interviews with all 
levels of management and workers, and from plant walk-
throughs and observation. The program areas of management 
complexity, management commitment, management involvement, 
financial commitment, safety policy statement, safety rules, 
safety staff, management efficiency, and plant solvency were 
rated on a scale of one (very poor) to seven (excellent). 
The data verified the 1975 questionnaire study and indicated 
differences in the practices of the high and low accident 
rate plants in several areas. 
The researchers found that the low accident rate plants 
showed greater management commitment to safety and had more 
extensive or comprehensive employee relations programs. 
Managers had greater one to one interaction with employees, 
and more sophisticated selection techniques were also used 
at the low accident rate plants. In addition, those plants 
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also had higher financial stability and solvency, in that 
they appeared to be more efficient, and conformed to good 
management procedures. Both types of plants received 
comparable ratings in terms of buildings and equipment, yet 
the low accident rate plants had better housekeeping 
practices. 
In regards to safety program characteristics, more high 
accident rate plants had specific personnel in safety 
spending more time on safety matters, as well as a higher 
level of employee participation on safety committees. The 
low accident rate plants more often used lead workers to 
train new employees in safety while high accident rate 
plants more often used supervisors or training personnel in 
that function. Both types of plants used on-the-job 
training. The low accident rate plants had more formal 
hazard inspection procedures yet neither used very formal 
procedures. There was little follow-up as to whether 
spotted hazards were taken care of. In terms of safety 
policy, accident investigations, and record-keeping all of 
the plants were rated the same. Few plants investigated 
more than accidents with serious injuries. 
In summary, the low accident rate plants had greater 
management commitment to safety, with active involvement of 
management in the safety program being the key to promoting 
safety. The low accident rate plants' management dealt with 
employees on a human level. They had a higher regard for 
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employees, treated employees with respect and sympathy. 
There was lots of communication between management and 
employees, more frequent and positive contacts between 
management and employees, and management appeared closer to 
employees in that they knew the names of the employees. In 
addition, the low accident rate plants had more employee 
relations programs such as training, affirmative action, and 
benefits. The researcher concluded that the low accident 
rate plants have better safety performance because they have 
better core workforces, or that they have better core 
workforces because they have better work conditions, 
employee selection techniques, and better management styles. 
The researchers did find two areas of safety that 
lacked sufficient attention. Few of either types of plants 
offered formal safety training, an area that needed 
improvement. In addition, the researchers advise "whatever 
the case, the failure to investigate non lost-time accidents 
and incidents was a major deficiency in the safety programs 
of both the low and high accident rate plants studied" 
(Smith et al., 1978, p. 14). 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide an 
overview of the various approaches to safety. The first 
step in achieving a safe environment, as per Smith et al., 
1978, is to provide a good working environment, with 
management commitment, communication, and solid employee 
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relations. In addition, training and accident investigation 
are also needed. From this point, perhaps it is best to 
review the organizational culture and resources, in deciding 
whether to use incentives, posters, fear messages, or 
organizational behavior management. A program well 
prepared, implemented, and evaluated on effectiveness seems 




Safety is not a resource; it is not an influence; it is 
not a procedure; and it certainly is not a program. 
Rather, safety is a state of mind, an atmosphere that 
must become an integral part of each and every 
procedure that the company has (Petersen, 1988, 
p. 91). 
Incident-Focused Safety Management 
For many companies, the approach to a safer work place 
has been founded on an incident-focused approach to safety. 
This type of approach is based on three assumptions: 
1) Employee commitment and awareness can be gained via 
pledges, campaigns, and incentives, 2) Individual 
responsibility, commitment and awareness will result in safe 
behavior and few incidents, and 3) Accident rates are valid 
indicators of safe performance (Dial, 1992, p.37). However, 
there are several problems with these assumptions. One 
problem is that responsibility is confused with culpability. 
Awareness of a hazard does not necessarily result in a 
change of behavior. Additionally, the use of incentive 
programs assume that the work environment is supportive of 
safety, and that safety is not part of the organization's 
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culture. Dial (1992) notes, "In fact, working safely is so 
far outside the culture that management is willing to tender 
superfluous rewards in an attempt to coax employees to work 
safely" (p. 38). The use of incentives can also lead to a 
dependency on them. To continue promoting safety, bigger 
and better incentives must be used. In addition, when 
incident-focused, management assumes that the only obstacle 
to safety is an employee's lack of care and caution. If 
employees would only set their minds to avoid all exposure, 
zero incidents would occur. This mindset ignores all of the 
possible system errors that cause employees to perform 
unsafe behaviors. 
Another major problem with using the incident-focus 
approach to safety is that for many organizations, their 
accident rates only reflect random fluctuations (Dial, 1992, 
p. 39). Often, an organization will meet their goal in 
reducing accidents, but as soon as the resources once 
applied to safety are redirected, the numbers of incidents 
rise again. A basic safety axiom is that is impossible to 
eliminate all accidents (Gilmore, 1970). If the capability 
of an accident exists, mathematical probability will direct 
the frequency. A safe organization should set the goal of 
reducing the probability of accidents to occur. 
Even if an organization's incident rate is 
statistically valid, it still only provides after-the-fact 
information. Mere review of the numbers of accidents does 
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not define the internal problems that caused them. If an 
organization sets its safety goal at zero incidents, their 
focus will be on the outcome, not on the steps toward 
safety. Instead, organizations need to work toward 
continuous safety improvement. The first step is to develop 
an organizational culture that values safety. Top 
management needs to be transformed, so that everyone truly 
believes in safety. Then, by using a behavior based safety 
process, the barriers to safety can be overcome. 
Paradigm Shift 
To maximize safety, a paradigm shift must occur. The 
new way to look at safety is that unsafe acts and 
conditions, and the resulting accidents and injuries, are 
all symptoms of something wrong with the management system 
(Ezell, 1992, p. 152). Safety needs to be seen as an 
operational strategy, not as a social strategy. Charles 
Ezell, a safety director, links safety to Philip Crosby's 
Absolutes of Quality Management (1984). Ezell suggest three 
principles of total safety management: 1) management must 
be a vital part of the total safety organization, 
2) management must be held accountable for safety 
performance, and 3) management must be a part of accident 
causation sequence (Ezell, 1992, p. 152). 
Another safety researcher, Thomas Krause, writes 
"safety and quality are two sides of the same coin" (Krause, 
1993, p. 47). Krause defines the ordinary Safety Cycle: 
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1) low safety performance leads to 2) high quality attention 
to safety leading to 3) improved safety performance leading 
to 4) scarce resources moved elsewhere leading to 1) low 
safety performance (Krause, 1993, p. 48). 
Statistical Process Control {SPC) 
Just as in quality, the use of statistical process 
control can be applied to safety. In SPC terms, upstream 
factors are processes such as practice, research, or hard 
work, while downstream factors are the results such as 
skill, new product, or better pay. Traditional safety 
programs measure the downstream factors of accident rates. 
In SPC management, the measurement of the upstream factors, 
in this case unsafe behaviors, are the key to safety. These 
upstream factors are predictive of the defects in the 
system. 
In the old systems of safety, "in part because the 
linkage is indirect between the upstream and downstream 
factors of safety performance, management does not know what 
to pay attention to and, therefore, tends to overreact to 
random variability in accident rates" (Krause, 1993, p. 48). 
This focus on the accident rates bypasses the possible 
problems of exposure, the management system, the culture, 
and ignores how the management system directly affects 
employee behavior. Meanwhile, the blame placed on the 
employee often results in employee resentment and 
resistance. The behavior-based approach to safety coincides 
with Deming's point that management has the responsibility 
to fix management programs. Quality and safety are linked 
together. 
Deming's 14 Points 
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Another safety researcher, Stephen Motzko (1989) has 
applied Deming's 14 Points of Quality (1986) to safety (see 
table 1). The first point can be translated into improving 
safety and employee health. Motzko challenges safety 
professionals in point two to move from accident reduction 
and common sense programs to finding new approaches for the 
same problems. In point three, he advises that program 
audits be stopped, in that they audit compliance, but do 
nothing to help the system. In regards to the fourth point, 
companies can minimize total cost by working with a single 
supplier. Safety is usually the last program to receive 
money, and many times purchase decisions are made on the 
basis of cost alone. Investment in good equipment pays off 
in the long run. 
In order to meet point five, safety must be looked at 
as a process, not just in terms of end results. Point six 
refers to the need for training. Not only must the amount 
of training be increased, but training must be done in terms 
of skill development. The appropriate training techniques 
must be used for different types of training, and different 
types of employees. In regards to point seven, it is 
important to remember to help people to be more safe, not 
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just merely rate them. One of Deming's strongest points is 
TABLE 1 
DEMING'S 14 POINTS APPLIED TO SAFETY 
1. Create constancy of purpose for improvement of 
product and service. 
2. Adopt the new philosophy. 
3. Cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality. 
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis 
of price tag alone. 
5. Improve constantly and forever every process for 
planning, production and service. 
6. Institute training on the job. 
7. Adopt and institute leadership. 
8. Drive out fear. 
9. Break down barriers between staff areas. 
10. Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for 
the work force. 
11. Eliminate numerical quotas for the work force and 
numerical goals for management. 
12. Remove barriers that rob people of pride of 
workmanship. Eliminate the annual rating or merit 
system. 
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and self-
improvement for everyone. 
14. Put everybody in the company to work to accomplish 
the transformation. 
Source: Stephen M. Motzko, "Variation, system improvement, 
and safety management," 1989, pp.17-20. 
number eight, which is to drive out fear. This includes the 
fear of reporting incidents, and the fear of speaking up 
about hazards and system problems. In order to achieve the 
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ninth point, safety must be for everyone, and communication 
and team work are essential. The tenth point often confuses 
many companies who have made slogans, exhortations, and goals 
a common practice. However, if these items are used in an 
environment that does not support them, they only lead to 
employee frustration. 
Deming's 11th point has always created much controversy, 
since numerical quotas are firmly set into the structure of 
many American businesses. However numerical measures need to 
be statistically significant and consistently applied and 
interpreted. If they are not handled properly, it is better 
to delete them. The 12th point has also caused debate, in 
that many companies can not comprehend a world without 
performance appraisals. This point applied to safety merely 
points out that rewarding individuals or departments for 
accident competition can create a destructive atmosphere, 
since many factors of safety are usually out of the employees' 
control. The last two points highlight the need for employees 
to be developed and challenged, and that everybody needs to be 
working for safety. 
Crosby's Quality Program 
Philip Crosby, another quality spokesperson, has a list 
of eight quality improvement concepts which can be applied to 
a behavior-based safety program. 
Just as the goal of quality is to minimize the 
variability of the quality of the product, the goal of safety 
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is to minimize the frequency and severity of incidents and 
accidents. By using the indicators of accident frequency, 
TABLE 2 
CROSBY'S EIGHT QUALITY CONCEPTS APPLIED TO SAFETY 
1. Constancy of purpose. 
2. Process, not program. 
3. Do it right the first time. 
4. Don't blame the employee. 
5. Specify standards in operational terms. 
6. Use measurement of upstream factors to assess 
performance. 
7. Improve process, not downstream results. 
8. Use statistical techniques to distinguish variation 
due to common cause from variation due to special 
causes. 
Source: Thomas R. Krause, John H. 
Hodson, "Measuring safety performance: 
1991, p. 50. 
. Hidley, & Stanley J. 
The process approach, " 
frequency of observation, the percentage of actions that rate 
as safe, safety-related maintenance information, and 
involvement indicators and surveys, organizations can make the 
timely changes necessary to management systems in order to 
eliminate unsafe behaviors. As the number of unsafe behavior 
incidents decreases, so will the probability of accidents. 
Companies Who Have Achieved Safety Improvement 
DuPont is known for its safety culture. In 1985 A 
Passion for Excellence cited DuPont for its approach to 
safety. The authors write "Dupont's safety record is 
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seventeen times better than the chemical industry average, and 
sixty-eight times better than manufacturing as a whole" 
(Peters & Austin, 1985, p. 282) . This concentration on safety 
is a part of the culture, grounded in the history of the 
company. Management is held accountable for safety. One 
manager stated "'If I had to choose between losing a major 
account and taking a minor on-the-job lost-time accident, it 
would be easy. I'd prefer the loss of the account'" (Peters 
& Austin, 1985, p. 283). From the top down, safety is an 
integral part of the culture. While implementing a quality 
program, DuPont has kept safety out of it, because they see 
safety as too important to be part of a "program." 
DuPont's focus on safety has spread outside of the 
company itself. Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) selected 
a DuPont Company safety seminar to begin their work on 
improving safety within their Transmission and Distribution 
Department (Donovan, 1989, p. 80). DuPont consultants helped 
PECO tailor the DuPont safety seminar to fit PECO's needs. 
The seminar was then held for more than 650 management level 
employees. From there, PECO used field personnel as course 
trainers, who then went out and taught seminars covering how 
to recognize unsafe acts and conditions, as well as safety 
observation techniques. In addition, safety became the first 
item of business at staff meetings. Most importantly, the 
attitude of getting the job done quickly has changed to 
allowing enough time to do a job safely. PECO began to use 
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prizes and recognition for safety awareness and attitude, as 
well as completion of safety goals. The company looks at 
DuPont's program as an approach to a safety culture, one 
" ... which requires constant reinforcement and a continuing 
demonstration of company commitment" (Donovan, 1989, p. 81). 
Another company who utilizes a safety program from DuPont 
is Florida Power and Light. S.T.O.P., or Safety Training 
Observation Program, trains employees to spot potential 
dangerous situations. Before implementing this program, 
Florida Power & Light would classify injuries by categories, 
and have appropriate training, such as back injury prevention 
training. This approach never really looked at the root 
causes. By using the S.T.O.P. program, and by developing a 
safety management protocol, with procedures and checks at all 
levels, the company was able to see improvement in the number 
of lost time accidents and doctor-treated cases. In addition, 
an increase in the number of reported unsafe acts and 
conditions demonstrates that safety is being taken seriously. 
Florida Power & Light is known for being a leader in the 
area of total quality management, as a winner of the Deming 
Award. In addition to the use of the DuPont safety program, 
the application of TQM principles to safety has also helped 
the company to achieve a low safety record. In the West Palm 
Beach district, a team began working on employee safety in 
1989. While analyzing doctor-treated cases, they found that 
of 19 total cases, 15 were wounds. Of these cases, ten were 
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due to dog bites. The team set a target goal for zero and 
then brain-stormed reasons for dog-bites. They compared 
their list to a survey of the ten cases to find the root 
causes. As a result, all meter readers were told that all 
dogs are a risk. A plastic meter reading card was created so 
that if the customer did not secure their dog, the customer 
could take the reading using the plastic card. The team then 
set up an action plan and timetable to put the new system in 
place. In April of 1989, the team reviewed the accident 
rates, and found five new dog bite cases. After analysis of 
those cases, the team made modifications. For example, they 
discovered that due to the size of the cards, the readers were 
not always carrying them. The cards were then modified to 
fold in half, in order to fit easily into a pocket. Again, 
while all accidents are not preventable, by searching for root 
causes, the probability of accidents can be severely 
decreased, resulting in a much safer environment. 
In 1991, DuPont began a major restructuring which 
resulted in almost one-half of the company's reporting levels 
being eliminated. As a result, the 65 employees of the 
corporate safety and health department were replaced with the 
SHE (Safety, Health, and Environmental) Excellence Center. 
With only half the original staffing, the center works to 
continue networks and partnerships to help DuPont manage 
safety (LaBar, 1993, p. 28). By keeping their commitment to 
safety, DuPont has demonstrated that safety can be streamlined 
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and downsized like any other part of the business. 
Another chemical company, Dow Chemical Company is working 
to achieve better safety rates while at the same time, 
reducing safety staffing levels 25 percent by 1997 (LaBar, 
1993, p. 28). To do so, they created the Dow Safety 
Improvement System, which identifies ten key elements of a 
safety program, and 13 programs of emphasis for the company. 
The corporate director for safety, loss prevention, and 
security, John Oldner, attributes the emphasis on continuous 
improvement as an important reason why safety performance has 
improved while the staffing levels are reduced. 
In another approach to safety, the Mecklenburg County 
Engineering Department began with a survey of employees' 
attitudes, opinions, and morale as a reaction to a costly year 
of work-related injuries. As a result, they discovered that 
employees were frustrated by department hierarchy, wanted 
input in decision making, participation in problem solving, 
and recognition for good performance. From 1985 until 1990 
they developed a quality control program, employee suggestion 
program, recognition programs, and a team safety program. For 
the team safety program, management began with a analysis of 
the most hazardous areas. They then formed work groups in 
those areas, and analyzed their accidents. Management 
concluded that unsafe behaviors caused most of the accidents. 
A program was then developed where employees worked as a team 
to remove the safety problems, incentives were awarded 
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immediately, and employees were helped to see the impact of 
their unsafe behavior. Each team was to be rewarded based on 
its total safety performance. The pilot test conducted in one 
section of the department brought immediate results. However, 
when management expanded the team program to another section, 
they discovered that the program as is did not transfer well. 
In the second group tested, the organizational culture of the 
section was not as conducive for the team concept. As a 
result, management let the employees of that section re-design 
the teams. This reduced a lot of resistance to the program, 
and eventually resulted in success. The engineering 
department summarized the necessary ingredients to their team 
safety program as 1) positive awards, 2) team competition, 
team recognition, team rewards, and team peer pressure, and 
3) employee input (Lanier, Jr., 1992, pp.22-25). 
In 1983, when the Japanese company, 
Corporation bought Firestone's La Vergne plant, 
Bridgestone 
the injury 
incidence rate was rising while production and employment were 
declining. However, Bridgestone was able to turn these 
figures around through the use of employee involvement. The 
first step was for the company to begin listening to 
employees. Quality circles were formed and named the Employee 
Involvement Group (EIG). Due to the employee improvement 
suggestions from these groups, incident rates dropped over 
five years from 11.8 per 200,000 work hours to 2.2 in 1986. 
The Safety Director said: "'I think the EIG's have addressed 
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some things that nobody else would have seen. That is their 
biggest function. They know the equipment as well as anybody, 
or better'" (LaBar, 1989, p. 103) . In addition to the 
employee involvement groups, the plant also utilizes a safety 
committee, extensive training for new hires, and monthly 
departmental safety meetings. Again, by making safety an 
integral part of the work life, and by utilizing employee 
involvement, companies can see an incredible turn around of 
safety statistics. 
Another chemical company, Occidental Chemical, began in 
1983 to build a new safety culture. The new president and 
CEO, J. Roger Hirl decided to use the company's safety record 
to measure success. "Safety progress ... ought to coincide with 
success in other aspects of the business like quality, 
customer satisfaction, and productivity" (Smith, 1992, p. 65). 
By focusing on the safety process, and how safety impacts on 
the other parts of the business, and vice versa, Occidental 
began promoting a safety culture. "Safety + Quality + 
Productivity = The Formula for Success" was adopted as a 
manufacturing slogan in 1985. Along the way, employee-run 
safety meetings, safety committees, and employee-conducted 
tours for visitors and clients all became a part of the safety 
culture. When Occidental began their TQM program "Oxy Quality 
Plus," the director of quality management stated that the 
safety program's use of employee involvement, training, and 
charting performance assisted in the implementation of the 
quality program. 
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"Like quality ... safety is a continuous 
process of improvement" (Smith, p.66). 
In 1987, Occidental began work on a Safety Congress, 
which took two years to design. In 1989, participants of all 
of the divisions of the company met to list their safety 
concerns. The employee and management lists were then 
combined, prioritized, and the top 19 ideas were analyzed by 
teams. At the end of the Congress, each team made 
presentations to the group. Because of the commitment to 
safety, honesty was a vital part of the Congress. At one 
point, during a discussion, one employee stated there were 
times when production came before safety. When management 
questioned the group for specific examples, other employees 
spoke up and provided them. Management listened and believed. 
After the Safety Congress, the participants returned to their 
own locations, and were able to work on their individual 
plant's safety programs with the many new ideas shared at the 
Congress. In another big step toward safety, Occidental has 
become an OSHA Voluntary Protection Program participant. Five 
worksites have earned OSHA star recognition, which means they 
have safety and health programs in excess of OSHA standards, 
and better than average incidence rates. The company joined 
the program to help get national recognition for their 
employees who make safety a part of the culture. 
In 1988, the Delaware City plant of Georgia Gulf, a 
producer of PVC had the worst safety record in the company. 
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As a result, they created a safety process named H.E.A.D. (use 
your HEAD to Erase All Dangers). In 1988 the safety steering 
committee analyzed three years of accident reports. They 
discovered that over 30% of accidents in one area originated 
from one task; the opening and closing of valves. They found 
that the root problem was that the valves were difficult to 
open. The committee also found that 84% of hand injuries were 
due to a failure to wear proper equipment. As a result, the 
committee began observing and giving feedback on the use of 
equipment. In addition, management made sure that good 
equipment was provided and that the valves were standardized. 
After the implementation of the HEAD program, the plant only 
experienced one valve incident. 
Georgia Gulf also recognizes the link between safety and 
quality. "Safety performance is trending toward continuous 
improvement. And along with that trend in safety has come 
improvement with quality" (Krause, 1993, p. 53). The plant 
discovered that when they keep regular sampling of the work 
force behavior and condition, quality is high. Quality slips 
just before their injury rates go up. Another side benefit of 
the safety process is that the plant has won awards for 
outstanding environmental performance. In addition, the 
company now looks at the safety programs of its suppliers. 
Once quality and safety becomes an integral part of a company, 
it begins a ripple effect. Suppliers are the next step in the 
both the quality and safety chain. 
54 
Another company which links quality and safety is Unocal. 
In 1984, Unocal began using Crosby's quality theories. In 
1988, after a major explosion and fire at one of their plants 
which resulted in the death of an employee, the company 
reviewed their safety program. During the course of the 
review, Unocal realized they could apply quality principles to 
safety. The Safety Improvement Process (SIP) has four safety 
absolutes: 1) Conformance to requirements, 2) Prevention--
look at root causes, not after the fact, 3) Zero Defects--
which represents the goal of continuous improvement to strive 
for, and 4) Cost of Safety--the company needs to know the 
total costs of safety to help in prioritizing (Minter, 1991, 
p. 47). 
After establishing the Four Absolutes of Safety, Unocal 
surveyed their employees about the current safety program. A 
safety council developed a mission statement, and set up a 
committee to develop a cohesive safety program and standards. 
The safety program was categorized into eight areas: 
1) Procedures and Standards, 2) Reporting Responsibility, 
3) Safety Equipment, 4) Training and Communications, 
5) Maintenance and Inspection 6) Audits, 7) Recognition, and 
8) Emergency Responses. The committee then developed a two 
volume set of safety regulations and procedures for the total 
company, which is subject to annual reviews. (Minter, 1991, 
p. 48). 
Unocal found that the biggest challenge in developing the 
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SIP was changing peoples' attitudes. The company was able to 
do so through management commitment and leading by example. 
At the corporate headquarters, 50% of staff meetings every two 
weeks were spent reviewing accidents, to find the lack of 
control. One senior vice president states: "An accident 
report is not a closed matter ... until the cause is rooted out 
and proper controls are put in place to keep the same thing 
from happening again" (Kiesche, 1990, p. 25). Management 
commitment was also demonstrated via capital expenditures for 
supplies, for the program, and for training. 
Training has played an important part in Unocal's safety 
success. In opening a new plant, "Unocal took the approach 
that in teaching its new employees how to perform their jobs 
correctly, it would be teaching them how to work 
safely •.. safety is covered as one of the various requirements 
of performing a quality job" (Minter, 1991, p. 49). 
Contractors working on Unocal property are required to attend 
a one and one-half hour course on Unocal safety procedures. 
In addition, when Unocal opened their new corporate 
headquarters, each employee had to attend safety training 
before they could enter the new building (Kiesche, 1990, 
p. 25). 
Other important parts of Unocal's safety process include 
the use of self audits. In reporting, near misses and minor 
injuries are considered just as important as major incidents. 
In review of the minor injuries of truck drivers, the safety 
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council discovered that the company did not have a uniform 
design standard for trucks. Drivers, unfamiliar with how the 
trucks were outfitted, were experiencing burns, pulled 
muscles, or twisted ankles due to different equipment. As a 
result, Unocal required design standards to be met by truck 
manufacturers, and began standard training on the use of new 
equipment. Unocal also believes in teamwork in safety. They 
share safety ideas and information with other members of the 
Chemical Manufacturing Association through the industry's 
Responsible Care Program. In summary of the total Safety 
Improvement Process, however, Unocal has realized that "'You 
can't manage the outcome; you have to manage the process' " 
(Kiesche, 1990, p. 26). 
In order to create a safe working environment while 
adapting to an extremely competitive, global and diverse work 
place, companies need to stop being incident-focused. Using 
the tools of total quality management such as statistical 
process control, management commitment, and employee 
involvement is one way for companies to achieve their safety 
goals. Safety and quality should not just be the current 
buzzwords of a management fad. Rather, both are necessary for 




In designing the research project, the following 
hypotheses were developed: 
Hypothesis 1: Incentive programs focused on accident 
rates alone do not prevent accidents. 
Hypothesis 2: A safety program that directs attention to 
sate behavior will help lower the number of accidents. 
Upon review of the results of the research study, answers to 
the various questions will provide the researcher with 
information regarding the following: 
1. Do the employees understand the current safety 
program? 
2. How safe do employees feel in their jobs? 
3. How important is safety? 
4. What do employees feel help them in working safely? 
5. What kind of impact, in terms of how well they 
remember from year to year, does the safety program have 
on employees? 
This information can then be reviewed to help determine what 
parts of the safety program are useful. If the research 
project supports the first hypothesis, that incentives based 
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on accident rates alone do not prevent accidents, a company 
will then know where not to spend their money. If the second 
hypothesis, that safety programs focused directly on safe 
behavior do result in a lower accident rate is supported, 
companies will know where to best apply monies and action to 
increase safety. This knowledge will provide a solid stepping 
stone in the construction of an effective safety program. 
Research Procedure 
The hypotheses will be tested by a collection of survey 
data from all of the non-exempt employees of three divisions 
of a publicly-held company. The company is a warehouse 
distribution operation which currently has a safety incentive 
program in place, that awards for time without accidents. 
Overview of Safety Program 
For all three divisions, the current safety incentive 
program was implemented in April 1989, the beginning of the 
1990 fiscal year for the company. At that time, employees 
began to accumulate points for each month they went accident 
free. A "lost time" accident resulted in a greater loss of 
points than an accident that only resulted in medical 
treatment. At the end of the fiscal year, each employee was 
allowed to order a prize from a catalog utilizing the points 
they earned for that year. The selection of items included 
jewelry, sport equipment, kitchen appliances, and electronics. 
In fiscal year 1993 the program was expanded to also 
award points based on employee attendance at work and 
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attendance at safety meetings, in addition to the time without 
accidents. Also, at the end of the year, the accumulated 
points were paid out in the form of a gift certificate for a 
national retailer, instead of the use of the prize catalog. 
An employee who had no sick days, attended every safety 
meeting, and had no accidents was eligible to earn 60 points, 
which was then converted to a $60 gift certificate. 
Although attendance at the monthly safety meeting was 
only awarded in Fiscal Year 1993, for the most part, 
attendance at the meetings was strongly recommended since the 
beginning of the program. Safety meetings were implemented as 
part of the corporate safety program in 1986. Lasting 
approximately 30 minutes, the meetings would cover topics 
supplied by the corporate office. Materials such as hand-
outs and video-tapes were often utilized. Many topics were 
repeated yearly, such as fire safety and tornado safety. Some 
months when no topic was provided, each division could then 
create its own program. In addition to covering the topic of 
the month, the safety meetings were also utilized as a forum 
for the local division to bring up safety issues specific to 
their current needs, and for employees to raise any safety 
concerns to be addressed by management and/or the safety 
committee. 
The safety committee was added to the company program in 
1990. Each division recruited volunteers to serve on the 
committee. Walk-throughs of the local plant to catch safety 
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violations and/or potential problems, as well as identifying 
educational needs are the main responsibilities of the 
committee. Each division is allowed the autonomy to expand 
the safety committee's responsibilities as need requires. 
The safety incentive program, monthly safety meetings, 
and the safety committee are the key components of the safety 
program developed by the corporate office and implemented 
company wide. In addition, individual divisions were allowed 
the autonomy to address safety in other ways if they felt the 
need. For example, in 1990 Division A held a couple drawings 
for several $100 bills. The names of all employees who had 
been accident free for the specified time period were put into 
a box, and several names were drawn. This was done in an 
attempt to highlight the rewards of being accident free, due 
to a sharp increase in the number of accidents the previous 
year. 
Methodology 
The design of this study includes a survey. This 
allowed for some degree of anonymity for those surveyed to 
respond honestly on the issues of safety within their work 
environment. Three separate surveys were designed for this 
study, in order to collect information directly from the non-
exempt employees, the management staff involved in the 
administration of the program, and the accident statistics. 
The first survey (see Appendix 1) is comprised of three 
pages. This questionnaire was distributed to all of the non-
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exempt employees that participate in the safety incentive 
program. Questions were asked to determine the employees' 
perceptions of safety within the work environment. Employees 
were asked to respond to statements such as "I follow safety 
procedures" and "Safety meetings provide me with information 
that helps me in my job" on a four-point scale. The 
employees were also asked whether they felt that certain 
aspects of their work and the safety program were important to 
the safety of the work environment. On the last page of the 
questionnaire, employees were asked to list the number of both 
reported and non-reported accidents they had, as well as 
demographic information. 
At the end of the questionnaire, the non-exempt 
employees were asked questions to determine whether they 
remembered parts of the incentive program and the safety 
meetings from year to year. The final question, "What do you 
think would make _____ a safer place to work?" was asked to 
solicit additional ideas for the occupational safety program. 
The second survey ( see Appendix 2) was designed to 
retrieve the archival data on OSHA 200 recordable accidents. 
This information is necessary to determine if the accident 
rates of the three divisions had declined after the 
implementation of the safety incentive program. Each division 
was given one survey, and asked to fill in the number of OSHA 
200 recordable accidents per month for the calendar years of 
1988 through 1993. In addition, a miscellaneous comments 
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section was given, in order to provide the opportunity for a 
division to elaborate on any information they felt might have 
affected the accident rates during this time period. 
The final survey (see Appendix 3) was created to survey 
the top three operation managers of each division. All of 
these managers share the responsibility for implementation and 
monitoring of the division's safety program, as well as for 
the safety meetings. The managers were surveyed to confirm 
that the safety program had been implemented per the corporate 
guidelines for all of the years being reviewed. In addition, 
the managers were given the opportunity to list any factors 
that they felt had an impact on the number of accidents. The 
managers were also asked whether they felt that the current 
safety program should be continued. The final question, "I 
think we could improve safety by ____ " was asked to solicit 
their feelings on how to improve safety. 
Sample Size and Response Demographics 
Each month, every division of the company is required 
to hold safety meetings. Depending on the size of the 
division, two to three meetings are held within a 24 hour 
period. All non-exempt employees are expected to attend the 
safety meeting. In fact, at the time of the survey, one of 
the criteria to earn the safety incentive was attendance at 
each month's safety meetings. Because of management support, 
all employees present at work on the day of the meeting do 
attend. Therefore, the sample included all non-exempt 
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employees of the three divisions employed the day of the 
meeting. The only employees missing would be those who were 
sick or on vacation. The resulting sample was 241 employees. 
The breakdown was as follows: 129 at Division A, 47 at 
Division B, and 65 at Division c. The average age of the non-
exempt employees was 30, with 56% male and 44% female. The 
majority (71%) of the employees surveyed held warehouse 
positions. Twelve percent were in office positions, such as 
customer service and accounting. The remaining 17% of the 
employees reported to the inventory control, data processing, 
facility services, quality control, and transportation 
departments. Each division had both a day and night shift. 
The average tenure of the employees was four and one-half 
years, with three years being the average length of service in 
the current position. Of the three divisions surveyed, 
Division A was the only union facility. Forty percent of the 
non-exempt employees surveyed were union, while 60% were non-
union. 
No demographics were collected in the survey of 
operation managers, because of the small sample size. Each 
division had a distribution center manager, a day operations 
manager, and a night operations manager. Of the nine managers 
surveyed at the three divisions, eight of these managers 
responded. 
Procedures 
The questionnaires were distributed to the non-exempt 
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employees during each division's monthly safety meeting. The 
researcher was present at one of the divisions: the meetings 
at the other two divisions were led by a proctor. At all 
sites, the questionnaires were filled out on site during the 
meeting, collected immediately, and sealed in an envelope. 
The two divisions then mailed the envelopes directly to the 
researcher. In addition, the top three operation managers 
were surveyed via the separate questionnaire. The management 
questionnaires were left for the managers to complete during 
that same week. Self-addressed stamped envelopes were 
provided, so that the surveys could be mailed directly to the 
researcher. 
A written script and set of directions were mailed with 
the surveys to the two divisions, so that the questionnaires 
were presented and handled in the same manner at each site. 
Confidentiality for each survey response was promised. The 
employees were informed that the envelope with the completed 
surveys was to be sealed at the end of the meeting, and mailed 
directly to the researcher. No one from the company would 
look at the individual responses, and the results were to be 
reported in the aggregate to protect the confidentiality of 
the responses. 
Coding and entry of the survey results were done by the 
researcher due to the small sample size. The data were 
using SPSS PC. Basic processed 
including 
and analyzed, 




correlations among different demographic groups were also 
reviewed. Results of the open-ended questions were 
transcribed, and some are reported in the result section. 
Variables 
In this study the independent variables are the 
incentive program and safety meetings currently in place at 
the company participating in the study. In the current 
program, all non-exempt employees receive a non-cash material 
item upon completion of the designated time period without an 
accident. The type of incentive has changed throughout the 
years of the program implementation. Therefore, data was 
collected specific to each type of incentive used: gift 
certificate to a major retailer, and/or choice of products 
from a catalog. 
The dependent variable of this research is the number of 
accidents. This will be defined in terms of accidents 
recorded on the OSHA 200 Log, which are those accidents that 
require medical attention (greater than first aid), or lost 




The number of accidents per month for each division can 
be found on the OSHA 200 form. This document is required per 
federal law. Reporting is done on a calendar year basis. 
Table 3 reflects the OSHA recordable accident totals for the 
three divisions together. Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the number 
of OSHA recordable accidents broken down by month for each 
division for the calendar years of 1988-1993. Overall, 
there was a significant decline in the number of OSHA 
recordable accidents for the three divisions since the 
implementation of the safety program: in 1988, the last year 
before implementation of the safety incentive program, there 
were 65 total accidents for all of the divisions. In 1989 the 
number of accidents increased to 79, but for each year after, 
there was a steady decline in the number of accidents. In 
1993, there were only 42 accidents recorded for the three 
divisions. 
When the number of accidents is examined for each 
division separately, there is also a reduction in the number 
of accidents throughout the years of the safety program 
implementation. However, an erratic pattern of increases, as 
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well as decreases emerge. Division A, which is the largest of 
the three divisions in terms of number of employees, is 
TABLE 3 
TOTAL OSHA 200 RECORDABLE ACCIDENTS FOR 3 DIVISIONS 
1993< .•·1992 1991 1990 1989 1 1.988 
2 6 7 6 6 6 
6 2 8 12 5 4 
6 2 4 8 12 4 
. 
3 0 4 4 6 3 
·.·. 
May 0 6 4 4 4 3 
I••• . 
.:rune .•.. ·.· 0 3 5 2 6 6 
..... 
····• .. July/ 4 10 2 6 9 6 
9 1 4 6 6 10 
. . ... 
.. . September 1 3 4 5 6 8 
.· .. · 
1 7 5 2 4 4 
·. 
6 5 2 7 9 6 
·• 
.· ... Decel!lbet'.< 4 3 3 2 6 5 
42 48 52 64 79 65 
the most erratic of the three. In 1988 there were 27 
accidents recorded. This number increased to 38 in 1989, and 
to 46 in 1990. A decrease to 22 accidents in 1991 reflects 
the year with the least nul!lber of accidents. 1992 reflects a 
jump up to 36 accidents, and in 1993 there was another slight 
decrease to 26 recordable accidents. This erratic pattern 
makes it difficult to discern whether or not the safety 
program directly affected the number of accidents. 
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Of the three divisions, Division B demonstrates the 
greatest overall decrease in number of recordable accidents. 
While there was an increase in the number of recordable 
accidents from 1988 (20) to 1989 (23), the following years 
show a large decrease in accidents. In 1992 only four 
accidents occurred, and in 1993 that number increased only to 
seven. Overall, the decrease in the number of accidents was 
greater than 50%, suggesting that the safety program 
TABLE 4 
DIVISION A OSHA 200 RECORDABLE ACCIDENTS 
· .. 
. •·· · .. 1993 1992 1991 . 1990 1989 1988 
2 4 4 4 2 3 
2 2 2 11 1 1 
3 1 2 6 2 1 
2 0 2 4 3 1 
· ... May 0 4 2 2 1 3 
::;: 
June 0 2 1 2 4 2 .. 
3 6 1 1 4 3 
· .. ··· 
4 1 2 5 2 3 
. Sep1:.entber. 1 3 2 4 4 3 
October··· 1 7 2 1 4 1 
November 5 3 1 4 7 4 
Oecember · 3 3 1 2 4 2 
Total 26 36 22 46 38 27 
was successful in this division. 
Division C also experienced a reduction of 50% in the 
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number of recorded accidents, but also through an erratic 
pattern. While only 18 accidents were recorded in both 1988 
and 1989, this division experienced a peak number of 22 
accidents in 1991. A decrease in the number of accidents 
brought the number down to nine in 1993. Again, the decrease 
in the number of accidents points to success of the safety 
program. However, the fact that of the years surveyed, this 
division experienced the highest number of accidents in the 
third year of the program's implementation casts some doubt as 
the direct relationship between the program and the number of 
accidents. 
Of the three divisions, there appears to be no pattern 
to the fluctuation in the number of recorded accidents that is 
consistent among them. This inconsistency suggests the 
possibilities of other factors affecting the accident rate, or 
that the safety program itself did not affect the number of 
accidents. Division A experienced the greatest increase (14) 
in accidents during the third year of the safety program, from 
1991 to 1992, while their greatest decrease was from 1990 to 
1991 (24). This decrease could possibly be attributed to the 
drawings for $100 bills utilized by only Division A. Division 
B saw no increase in recorded accidents after the 
implementation of the safety incentive program, and had its 
greatest decrease the next year, 1989 to 1990, from 23 to 
seven. From 1990 to 1991 division c reported a 100% increase 
in the number of accidents, and an even greater decrease the 
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following year. 
Both Divisions Band C have experienced a more steady 
work flow, and number of employees. Division A, in contrast, 
completed a major expansion in 1989-1990 in terms of both 
business and the number of employees. The differences in the 
work flow as well as in tenure of employees may also have 
affected the accident rates. When the work flow is erratic, 
safety can sometimes take second place to meeting production. 
In terms of tenure, newer employees may be more prone to 
TABLE 5 
DIVISION B OSHA 200 RECORDABLE 
ACCIDENTS 
·. . ·· . ... 
1992 1991 1990 .. 1989· 1988 
0 0 2 2 3 
0 2 0 2 1 
0 1 1 7 1 
0 1 0 3 2 
.·. 
0 1 0 2 1 0 
1•·•···••··· . .1tihe > 0 0 2 0 1 3 
\ .· .· .. · ... ·.··•··•· gµly •· 0 2 0 0 3 2 
•· ·• 
/August>·. 2 0 0 0 2 4 
0 0 0 1 0 3 
octobe:r 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
.. ·. 
< ·Total 
··.·.· . .>.<-.-::- 7 4 8 7 23 20 
accidents, as they are often unfamiliar with work procedures 
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and equipment. However, as a norm, all three divisions work 
under the same basic operating procedures. The only noted 
difference among the divisions in terms of the implementation 
and administration of the safety program was that of 
Division's A $100 bill drawings in 1990. Otherwise, all the 
divisions conducted the safety program per the corporate 
instructions. 
TABLE 6 
DIVISION C OSHA 200 RECORDABLE ACCIDENTS 
•· I//•·•• 
1993 1992 1991·· 1990 1989 
0 2 3 0 2 0 
"' .. ·•·•··•·.··· . February 3 0 4 1 2 2 
.· .... ·•·March 2 1 1 1 3 2 
... 
1 ..... April 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 2 0 2 0 
.......... Jurte 0 1 2 0 1 1 
·. 
·.· \Itlly > 1 2 1 5 2 1 
August .. 3 0 2 1 2 3 
.September 0 0 2 0 2 2 
. ·. 
Qct;pber .·.•• 0 0 2 0 0 2 
· November 0 1 0 3 1 2 ... . .. 
December 0 0 2 0 1 3 
1. Total 9 8 22 11 18 18 
While the three divisions did see a decrease in the 
number of accidents overall during the course of the safety 
program, there has been no causal relationship demonstrated. 
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Increased training, continued tenure and therefore experience 
level of the employees, as well as new OSHA requirements are 
some of the other factors that could greatly affect the number 
of accidents in the divisions. Therefore, it is difficult to 
state definitively that the safety program resulted directly 
in the decrease in the number of accidents for the three 
divisions. In fact, the erratic pattern of increases and 
decreases in the number of recorded accidents for each 
division suggest a need for further study of this area. 
Management Perceptions 
Because of the small sample size of the management 
survey, a general review of the comments made on the surveys 
allows a limited view of how those managing the safety program 
perceive it. One of the managers surveyed commented: 
"Personally I think our facility is extremely safe. People 
rarely get hurt by accident. They usually get hurt by being 
careless." This manager felt that the safety program should 
not be continued in its present format. However, the other 
seven management responses all answered "yes" to the 
statement, "I would like to see the current safety program 
continue in its present format. 11 Suggestions to improve 
safety included having individuals involved in accidents 
discuss the situation to the other employees during the safety 
meetings, being more severe with careless employees, 
increasing employee awareness and involvement, and utilizing 
the safety committee in accident investigation. Another 
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manager proposed the creation of a corporate position in 
charge of safety with a budget for training films and 
materials for use of all the divisions. 
All of the surveys received did not answer fully whether 
the divisions had implemented the corporate safety programs 
per the company guidelines in all of the applicable fiscal 
years. However, all eight responses did answer affirmatively 
in regards to holding the safety meetings each month for all 
employees. 
Employee Perceptions 
Overall, the majority of the employees of the three 
divisions felt that the work environment was safe (see Table 
7). Sixty-nine percent felt that safety procedures were 
followed most of the time. However, 29% responded (some of 
the time) that safety procedures are only followed when 
convenient. Almost half (49%) of the employees answered that 
they follow safety procedures, as well as report safety 
hazards "always." Fifty-eight percent of the respondents 
state that they correct any safety hazards that are in their 
control. In regards to supervisors, 88% of the employees 
answered affirmatively to "I feel my supervisor believes in 
safety," while 81% agreed that their supervisor practices 
"safety first." The largest area of disagreement was to the 
statement "Safety is not important in my job." Thirty-nine 
percent responded with always/most of the time: 61% responded 
some of the time/never. However, 95% of the employees agree 
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that they follow safety procedures always/most of the time. 
In regards to the specific parts of the company's safety 
program, it appears that the employees perceive the safety 
meetings as having the greatest impact on their behavior. 
TABLE 7 
EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTIONS OF FREQUENCY OF SAFETY PHENOMENON 
Always/ Some of 
Statement Most of the 
the time time 
/Never 
In this company, safety procedures 86% 14% 
are followed. 
I follow safety procedures. 95% 5% 
I report safety hazards. 84% 16% 
I correct those safety hazards 90% 10% 
that are in my control. 
I feel the company believes in 88% 12% 
safety. 
I feel my supervisor believes in 88% 12% 
safety. 
Management corrects safety 72% 28% 
problems quickly. 
I feel that my safety concerns are 72% 28% 
treated seriously. 
Safety meetings provide me with 68% 32% 
information that helps me in my 
job. 
Safety hazards are not corrected 32% 67% 
in a timely manner. 
Safety is not important in my job. 39% 61% 
Safety procedures are only 33% 64% 
followed when convenient. 
My supervisor practices "safety 81% 19% 
first." 
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Eighty-two percent responded strongly agree/agree to the 
statement "I feel the safety meetings actually help change my 
behavior to be safe." Seventy-seven percent responded 
positively to the statement "I feel the safety incentive 
programs actually help change my behavior to be safe." When 
these statements were re-worded, "The safety incentive program 
does not help me to be safe," and "the safety meetings do not 
help me to be safe," similar results followed, suggesting the 
measures provide reliable results. The use of safety posters 
in affecting the employees' behavior was seen as helpful only 
by half of those responding. When asked if it is possible to 
reach both productivity rates and work safely, 74% responded 
positively. Eighty-nine percent of the employees believe it 
is possible to reach both quality standards and work safely. 
These responses are reinforced by the 75% of the employees 
responding positively to the statement: "I believe it is 
possible to reach both productivity and quality standards and 
work safely." 
In another section of the questionnaire, the employees 
were asked to respond yes or no as to the importance of the 
individual parts of the safety program, as well as other 
factors that could affect safety. The total results can be 
found in Table 9. While 87% of the employees felt that both 
the safety incentive program and the monthly safety meetings 
were important, three other factors received greater positive 
responses. Ninety-six percent of the employees responded that 
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orientation training was important to safety. Employee morale 
(90%) and quality standards (89%) also received high positive 
responses. When asked to rank the top two factors that are 
important to employee safety at the company, the most often 
TABLE 8 
EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY PROGRAM AND WORK STANDARDS 
Agree/ Disagree/ 
Statement strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
I feel the safety meetings 
actually help change my behavior 82% 18% 
to be safe. 
I feel the safety incentive 
programs actually help change my 77% 23% 
behavior to be safe. 
I feel the safety posters actually 
help change my behavior to be 52% 48% 
safe. 
I believe it is possible to both 
reach productivity rates and work 74% 26% 
safely. 
I believe it is possible to both 
reach quality standards and work 89% 11% 
safely. 
The safety incentive program does 26% 74% 
not help me to be safe. 
The safety meetings do not help me 18% 82% 
to be safe. 
The safety posters do not help me 36% 63% 
to be safe. 
I believe it is possible to reach 
both productivity and quality 75% 24% 
standards and work safely. 
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cited first and second choices were orientation training (18%) 
and employee morale (15%). The safety incentive program and 
monthly safety meetings were the second most cited factors. 
TABLE 9 
EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTIONS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SAFETY 
Items Relating to Safety Yes No 
Safety Incentive Program 87% 13% 
Monthly Safety Meetings 87% 13% 
Orientation Training 96% 4% 
Productivity Standards 56% 44% 
Safety Posters 61% 39% 
Work Hours 78% 22% 
Quality standards 89% 11% 
Employee Morale 90% 10% 
The question "I receive the safety incentive "Fox Bucks" 
for: (check any/all that apply)" was asked to survey the 
employees' understanding of the company's safety program. The 
results are shown in Table 10. The highest response was for 
having no accidents, and the second highest response was for 
attending safety meetings. These are the top two components 
of the company safety program. The other program requirement 
of showing up for work only received a response rate of 42%. 
However, this factor had just been added to the safety 
incentive program during the past year. It is interesting to 
note that 60% of the employees ranked working safely as a 
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component of the safety program. While this factor could be 
interpreted as being the same as having no accidents, per the 
literature review it is known that having no accidents does 
not necessarily imply working safely. The difference rate in 
responses, 74% for having no accidents, while 60% responded 
working safely, may reflect that some employees realize the 
difference between the two points. 
TABLE 10 
EMPLOYEES' KNOWLEDGE OF SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 
I receive the safety incentive "Fox Bucks for: 
(Check any/all that apply.) 
ILw Activity % Activity 
74% having no accidents 63% attending safety 
meetings 
42% showing up for work 18% completing tasks 
18% helping others 60% working safely 
When asked questions about their recognition and 
retention of the format of the safety program, there was an 
increase in the numbers of no responses. However, 45% of 
those responding had participated in the safety incentive 
program for all four years. When asked to list the amount of 
"Fox Bucks" they received last year, 14% replied that they had 
received the maximum amount, while almost half did not answer. 
The employees were also asked whether or not they remembered 
any of the prizes they had selected from the catalog in 
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previous years. A little over half of the employees responded 
that they did. Although the lack of responses affects the 
data, it appears that the prizes themselves are better 
remembered than the Fox Bucks. In fact, over 50 different 
prize items were recorded by the researcher in response to the 
request to list those prizes received. 
When surveyed as to which safety meeting topics were seen 
as most helpful, 42 topics were mentioned. However, there 
were several topics that were listed multiple times. Fire 
safety was the most often cited (n=25) topic that helped 
employees work more safely at home, while forklift safety 
(n=12) was the most popular work topic. Proper lifting 
techniques (n=14) was cited for both work and home. Lock 
out/Tag out, an OSHA safety training requirement was also 
cited (n=lO) as a helpful work safety topic. The employees 
listed kitchen safety, electrical safety and tornado/storm 
safety as other popular home safety topics. 
A review of the correlations between different 
demographic groups and various sets of questions from the 
employee survey did produce some areas for further study. 
Correlations run between sex and assorted questions resulted 
in no significant relationships. In the divisions surveyed, 
there was a fairly equal balance of both male (56%) and female 
(44%) employees. From these results, it appears that the 
employees' attitudes on safety within this company are not 
affected by gender. 
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Correlations run between tenure and other variables, for 
the most part did not produce any significant results. 
However, in responses to the statement "I feel the safety 
incentive programs actually help change my behavior to be 
safe," there was a one-tailed significance (r=-.15, p~.01). 
This may signify that the more tenured employees feel that the 
incentive program does help safety within the organization. 
As a result, the organization could look at ways of attracting 
the attention of less tenured employees to the program. This 
correlation may have connections to the high rating given by 
the surveyed employees to the importance of orientation 
training in safety. Perhaps increased training in safety, and 
on the safety incentive program should be built into the 
orientation training program, in order to help the less 
tenured employees perceive the value of the safety incentive 
program. 
In another correlation run, there was significant 
response to the statement "I feel the company believes in 
safety" and the number of non-reported accidents experienced 
(r=.15, p~.01). This may reflect that those employees who 
experience few or none non-reported accidents strongly believe 
the company supports safety, and vice versa. For further 
review, it may be beneficial to encourage employees who have 
accidents, reported or non-reported, to speak openly and 
honestly as to what they perceive to be the cause of the 
accidents. Until root causes of accidents are found, there 
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will continue to be accidents. 
Those employees who had few or no non-reported accidents 
also strongly responded to the statement "I feel that my 
safety concerns are treated seriously." (r=.16, p.:5..0l) As 
demonstrated throughout the literature review, employee 
autonomy and the state of labor-management relations can play 
an important role in safety. This correlation tends to 
support the theory that employees who feel that their comments 
and ideas are both listened to and acted upon will feel that 
their environment is more safe. 
It is interesting that the strongest correlation among 
those reporting few/no non-reported accidents is that to the 
statement "I believe it is possible to reach both productivity 
and quality standards and work safely" (r=. 23, p.:5.. 001) . This 
may also be linked to the issue of employee satisfaction, in 
that employees are more productive when there is quality of 
worklife, autonomy, and solid communication between employees 
and management. 
The demographic group that resulted in the most 
correlations was that of union status. In response to "I feel 
safety meetings actually help change my behavior to be safe", 
the negative correlation (r=-. 25, p.:5.. 001) reflects that union 
employees may tend to respond more negatively, while non-union 
employees responded more on the positive side. There was a 
negative correlation to the statement "I feel the safety 
incentive programs actually help change my behavior to be 
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safe" (r=-.30, p~.001), and a positive correlation to "The 
safety incentive program does not help me to be safe" (r=.22, 
p~. 001). These results suggest reliability on the correlation 
that those of union status do not feel the safety incentive 
program helps in promoting safety. 
The union status employees also demonstrated a negative 
correlation to the statements "I believe it is possible to 
both reach productivity rates and work safely," (r=-.34, 
p~.001) and "I believe it is possible to reach both 
productivity and quality standards and work safely"(r=-
.30,p~.001). In fact, the researcher had specifically 
developed these questions with the union status in mind, as 
many union members had previously commented that the standards 
forced employees to work at a pace that did not allow time to 
complete tasks safely. This may be an area for further 
research by the company, in searching for root causes and 




In looking for the answer to the research question: 
can the safety program be more effective? 
a definitive answer may not be necessarily found. However, as 
with any program, the research project can be used as a tool 
for evaluation. A review of the questions asked earlier in 
this thesis sets up an evaluation of the safety program. 
1. Do the employees understand the current safety 
program? 
The majority of the employees were able to correctly identify 
the two main components of the program. However, a little 
less than half (42%) were able to identify the third factor of 
showing up to work. In reviewing the significance of this 
difference, a review of the safety program reveals that the 
attendance factor had only been added to the safety incentive 
program during the past year. Perhaps the company might be 
more successful in making additions to the program by 
utilizing a different and/or better form of communication of 
changes to the program. On the other hand, perhaps the 
different levels of recognition highlight the disparity 
between the area of safety (having no accidents and attending 
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the safety meetings) and the area of attendance (showing up 
for work) . The safety program may be better understood by the 
employees if only behaviors directly related to safety are 
included. 
2. How safe do employees feel in their jobs? 
Overall, most employees felt that the work environment was 
safe. Employees themselves felt that they followed safety 
procedures and reported and/or corrected safety hazards. A 
large majority of employees also reported that their 
supervisors believed in and practiced safety. This last 
factor is extremely important in creating a safe environment, 
because management commitment, in this case demonstrated by 
the supervisors' actual practices, is vital to a strong safety 
program. 
3. How important is safety? 
While the employees recognize the safe environment they work 
in, there seems to be disagreement as to the importance of 
safety. The response to the statement "Safety is not 
important in my job" resulted in 39% answering "always/most of 
the time." Perhaps the safe environment is being taken for 
granted, or that employees of a specific area, for example the 
office, do not see their environment as particularly 
hazardous. 
4. What do employees feel help them in working safely? 
The answer to this question is interesting in that it differs 
from the emphasis the company places on various parts of the 
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safety program. The employees rated safety meetings as having 
a greater impact on their behavior (82%) than the safety 
incentive program (77%). However, when asked to respond to 
the importance of individual parts of the safety program, 
orientation training received the highest response (96%), even 
though this area has not received as much emphasis by 
management as others. Employee morale and quality standards 
were also highly rated, with the safety incentive program and 
monthly safety meetings also mentioned. The main emphasis of 
the company has been on the incentive program and monthly 
meetings. The implications of the employee's perceptions are 
mirrored by the findings of the many safety studies reviewed 
in this paper. Training and quality of worklife are very 
important components of a successful safety program. 
5. What kind of impact, in terms of how well they 
remember from year to year, does the safety program have 
on employees? 
The increase in the numbers of no responses to questions in 
regards to the incentive part of the safety program may 
suggest that the impact of the prizes over the years is 
minimal. The responses also reflect that employees may 
remember individual prizes more than the FoxBucks. This may 
help the company in choosing items for incentives in future 
programs. The varied response to the question of which safety 
meeting topics were seen as helpful suggests that the safety 
meetings themselves had a strong impact on the employees. It 
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appears that topics that were repeated each year, such as fire 
safety and lock out/tag out were well remembered and 
appreciated. 
For this research project, two hypotheses were developed. 
Hypothesis 1: Incentive programs focused on accident rates 
alone do not prevent accidents. 
In terms of the numbers of accidents, while the overall 
numbers did decline for the three divisions surveyed, there 
were erratic increases from year to year. In addition, the 
employees' perceptions of the safety program reflect that they 
believe other components of the safety program were more 
beneficial to their safety. The low recall of prizes from the 
incentive program as compared to the high recall of safety 
meeting topics might demonstrate that attention to safety 
hazards is more beneficial to employees than attention to 
accident rates. And, in conclusion, more employees responded 
that safety meetings affect their behavior than the safety 
incentive program. Therefore, some factors do support 
hypothesis one. 
Hypothesis 2: A safety program. that directs attention to safe 
behavior will help lower the number of accidents. 
There was an overall decrease in the number of accidents 
during the implementation of the safety program. The safety 
meetings, in addressing specific topics, provide attention to 
safe behavior in hazardous situations. The strong support of 
the employees on the issue of safety meetings, and the fact 
87 
that the safety meetings are the oldest part of the company's 
safety program might be perceived as support for this 
hypothesis. Most importantly, the literature review cites 
many studies and success stories of companies that focus on 
safe behavior as the root cause of an accident problem. The 
fact that the employees rated quality standards as an 
important factor for safety reflects that employees can see 
themselves the similarity of quality and safety. Getting 
employees involved in creating a safe environment is just as 
important as having the management commitment. In conclusion, 
there is support for hypothesis 2 in both the research results 
and the literature review. 
In summary, this research has shown that the company is 
on the right track in providing a safe environment. Less 
emphasis on the incentive side of the program, and more 
emphasis on employee involvement and training may help make 
the company safer. In addition, switching from review of the 
downstream factor of the OSHA 200 accident rates, to the 
upstream factors of safe behaviors may aid the company in 
focusing their time and money on the specific parts of the 
safety program that need further development. 
Ideas for Further Studies 
If the company were to decide to alter the safety program 
in the future, it might be beneficial to design both a pre-
and post-study which could isolate the various components of 
the safety program. Establishing a direct causal link between 
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variables would provide the most beneficial advice on 
improving a safety program. While much research has been 
conducted on various safety programs, it appears that the 
causal links between the program itself and the end result is 
most often the area of biggest uncertainty. Once causal links 
are established, the longevity of results would be another 
area of research to pursue. 
In summary, there are many factors to review in setting 
up a safety program for an organization. Most importantly, 
there must be a fit between the organization and the program 
itself. The Association of American RailRoads studied all of 
the United States' railroad safety programs. "' They found 
little program uniformity and no elements really essential to 
program success. Their results suggest the safety program 
must be right for the specific organization .•• There is no one 
safety program that is right for all'" (Petersen, 1988, 
p. 27). Continued research in the areas of incentives, 
positive reinforcement and feedback, employee attitudes, and 
organizational behavior management will assist in providing 
more insight in how to tailor safety programs specifically to 
an organization's culture. In our quest for the ultimate 






The purpose of this survey is to ascertain your ideas and 
feelings regarding ----,---'s safety program. Specifically, 
we would like to determine what parts of the program are more 
effective than others. By taking the time to complete this 
survey, you will be able to help improve the safety program, 
and overall safety at ____ THE INFORMATION IN THIS 
SURVEY WILL ONLY BE USED IN A SUMMARY FORM: YOUR INDIVIDUAL 
ANSWERS WILL BE HELD CONFIDENTIAL. Thank you for your time 
and contributions. 
DEFINITIONS 
Safety incentive program: program held during fiscal year 
which awards "FoxBucks" for attendance at safety meetings, 
time with no accidents, and daily attendance. 
Safety meeting: monthly meeting held at each division, where 
safety topic is presented, and safety issues/concerns are 
addressed. 
Productivity standards: standard set for warehouse workers 
regarding amount of work accomplished. 
Quality standards: standard set for warehouse workers 
regarding allowable amount of errors. 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING BY CIRCLING THE BEST RESPONSE: 
MOST OF SOME OF 
ALWAYS THE TIME THE TIME NEVER 
In this company, safety 
procedures are followed. 1 2 3 4 
I follow safety procedures. 1 2 3 4 
I report safety hazards. 1 2 3 4 
I correct those safety 1 2 3 4 
that are in my control. 
I feel the company believes 1 2 3 4 
in safety. 
I feel my supervisor believes 1 2 3 4 
in safety. 
Management corrects safety 1 2 3 4 
problems quickly. 
I feel that my safety 1 2 3 4 
concerns are treated seriously. 
Safety meetings provide me 1 2 3 4 
with information that helps me in my job. 
Safety hazards are not 1 2 3 4 
corrected in a timely manner. 
Safety is not important in my 1 2 3 4 
job. 
Safety procedures are only 1 2 3 4 
followed when convenient. 
My supervisor practices 1 2 3 4 
"safety first." 
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safety survey page 2 
Do you think the following items are important to your safety 
on the job? 
CIRCLE Y FOR YES, ORN FOR NO YES NO 
a) safety incentive program Y N 
b) monthly safety meetings Y N 
c) orientation training Y N 
d) productivity standards Y N 
e) safety posters Y N 
f) work hours Y N 
g) quality standards Y N 
h) employee morale Y N 
Please choose two items from above that you feel are the most 
important to your safety at , and put a #1 and a #2 in ----front of them to rank them. 
I receive the safety incentive 
that apply.) 
"Fox Bucks" for: (Check any/all 
---having no accidents ---attending safety meetings 
---showing up for work ---completing tasks ___ helping others ___ working safely 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING BY CIRCLING THE BEST RESPONSE: 
STRONGLY STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE 
I feel the safety meetings 1 2 3 4 
actually help change my behavior to be safe. 
I feel the safety incentive 1 2 3 4 
programs actually help change my behavior to be safe. 
I feel the safety posters 1 2 3 4 
actually help change my behavior to be safe. 
I believe it is possible 1 2 3 4 
to both reach productivity rates and work safely. 
I believe it is possible to 1 2 3 4 
both reach quality standards and work safely. 
The safety incentive 1 2 3 4 
program does not help me to be safe. 
The safety meetings do not 1 2 3 4 
help me to be safe. 
The safety posters do not 1 2 3 4 
help me to be safe. 
I believe it is possible to 1 2 3 4 
to reach both productivity and quality standards and work 
safely. 
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safety survey page 3 
Please place number of accidents you have been involved in 
while working at ____ , under the appropriate categories. 
(med=medical treatment) 
Accidents: No Med Med Treatment & Med Treatment & 
Treatment No Time Off Time off work 





Age _____ _ Sex: __ male female 
Functional Area of Work (please circle one): 
office warehouse facility services 
inventory control quality control 
data processing 
transportation 
Length of time in current position years ____ months 
Length of time with____ years ___ months 
Previous work functional area (if applicable) 
Are you (please circle one): Union Non-Union 
What division are you in: ----------------
I have participated in the safety incentive program in: (Please 
circle ALL that apply) 
Fiscal year '94 (4/1/93-3/31/94) (current year) 
Fiscal year '93 (4/1/92-3/31/93) (Sears gift certificate) 
Fiscal year '92 (4/1/91-3/31/92) (prize catalog) 
Fiscal year '91 (4/1/90-3/31/91) (prize catalog) 
Please list the amount of "Fox Bucks" you received last year: 
If you participated in the program one of the years using the 
prize catalog, do you remember what you ordered? 
__ -1,yes ___ no 
If yes, please list the prizes you received: 
Please list any safety meeting topics that you think 
specifically helped you to work safely at work & home: 
What do you think would make a safer place to work? 
APPENDIX 2 
DIVISION ARCHIVAL SURVEY 
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Management Questionnaire--Safety Survey 
PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS PAGE NEEDS ONLY BE FILLED OUT ONCE PER 
DIVISION. 
However, this information is crucial to the study; please 
complete as thoroughly as possible. 
Please list the number of OSHA 200 recordable accidents, as 
recorded on your OSHA 200 form for each year • 
. 




> <March ... •· 
April 












Management Questionnaire--Safety Survey 
THIS PAGE SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 1) DISTRIBUTION CENTER 
MANAGER, 2) DAY OPERATIONS MANAGER, AND 3) NIGHT OPERATIONS 
MANAGER. Separate envelopes have been provided to ensure 
confidentiality. THE INFORMATION IN THIS SURVEY WILL ONLY BE 
USED IN A SUMMARY FORM: YOUR INDIVIDUAL ANSWERS WILL BE HELD 
CONFIDENTIAL. Thank you for your time and contributions. 
We implemented the corporate safety programs per guidelines in 
(please circle all that apply): 
FY'91 FY'92 FY'93 FY'94 
If any changes or additions were made, please explain: 
In FY'94, what have you done with the FoxBuck cards provided 
by corporate? 
Are there any other factors that you feel would have had 
impact on the number of accidents? If so, please explain: 
1) Factor: 
2) Time Frame: 
3) Proposed impact: 
We hold a safety meeting for all employees every month. 
(please circle one) 
YES NO 
If you circled no, please explain when you hold safety 
meetings: 
who attends: 
I would like to see the current safety program continue in its 
present format. 
(please circle one:) Yes No 
I think we could improve safety by: 
THANK YOU! 
Colling, David A. 
technology. 
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